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W hen “Britannia ruled the waves”, Matthew Arnold defined the “En-glish genius” as “steadiness with honesty”, in contrast to the Celtic character, “an indomitable reaction against the despotism of fact”. 
As the Brexit countdown accelerates with no detailed UK proposals forthcom-
ing, the situation has reversed. The consequences for Ireland, both the Republic 
that will remain in the European Union and Northern Ireland that must leave, 
are forcing Brexiters to react reluctantly to the despotism of fact, while Ireland 
and the EU maintain a steady honesty about what Brexit means. The Irish sit-
uation has focused the EU’s approach to negotiations, stymied the British ap-
proach and forged a new role and identity for Ireland in the EU. A botched UK 
withdrawal from the EU threatens disaster for both parts of Ireland.
Brexit is the tyranny of ideology over politics. The EU draws up legal propos-
als; the UK offers tautologies (“Brexit means Brexit”) or platitudes (“no deal is 
better than a bad deal”, ignoring the fact that “no deal” is a “bad deal”). For 
Brexiters, the “recovery” of national sovereignty solves the ills of supranational 
globalisation. For the EU, supranational sovereignty buffers national citizens 
from the turbulent global capitalist market. By diluting national sovereignties 
in a single market, the EU as a whole has become the world’s largest economy. 
Brexiters say they know they must abandon the benefits of the EU, but scheme 
to “cherry-pick” advantages from the single market without the concomitant 
obligations of membership. Brexiters want to leave the single market and cus-
toms union, the EU Court and budget, and the free movement of EU citizens. 
This rules out participation in the European Economic Area. Brexiters say they 
will negotiate advantageous trade deals with every country in the world, in-
cluding the EU, displaying the smugness of “Rule Britannia” when Britannia 
no longer rules. They will have to compete against a much larger EU economy 
and market. The EU wants agreement on the status of EU citizens in the UK, on 
the budget the UK still owes, and on the status of Ireland and the Good Friday 
Peace Agreement that includes the EU in its enforcement. Without agreement on 
Ireland there will be no deal (without Spanish agreement over Gibraltar there 
will be no deal either). 
In order to begin negotiations the UK had to guarantee Brexit would not com-
promise the status quo of the peace process on the island of Ireland, based on 
a British-Irish international agreement. The very next day, Brexiter Ministers 
said that guarantee could be ignored, raising the spectre of “perfidious Albion”. 
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If Brexiters will ignore the binding commitments of other international agree-
ments, why would they comply with an EU agreement? When the EU rewrote 
the guarantee as a legally binding text the implications horrified the UK govern-
ment and its Unionist partners from Northern Ireland. The Union that defines 
the UK makes Brexit and the Irish status quo incompatible. If the UK leaves 
the EU, and if Northern Ireland remains part of the UK, then Northern Ireland 
leaves the EU and an EU border will divide the island of Ireland (and Cyprus 
will no longer be the only partitioned country in the EU). 
The Peace Agreement that ended the violence and obviated the border (one of 
the causes of the violence) was premised on the fact that both Ireland and the 
UK were EU members. The retrograde Brexit process reverses the dilution of 
national sovereignties through shared EU membership that facilitated the Peace 
Agreement. More than 140 specific areas in the agreement directly involve the 
EU. Detailed reports from the House of Lords predict Brexit’s devastating im-
pact on the economy and on the Peace Process. To negotiate an EU trade agree-
ment, the UK committed itself to a default or “backstop” solution that would 
harmonise Northern Ireland with the EU customs union and thus avoid a “hard 
border” if no other solution were to be found. 
Such an arrangement would effectively separate Northern Ireland from Great 
Britain, something unacceptable to the Unionists who keep the government in 
power. Now Downing Street wants to interpret this commitment to include all 
of the UK, thereby maintaining indefinitely a de facto customs union with the 
EU (a proposal rejected as “fantasy” by the EU). The UK government is debating 
two other possible solutions. One would be a customs “partnership” (not a cus-
toms “union”) in which the UK would collect EU tariffs on behalf of the EU on 
all goods passing through the UK on their way to the EU -a possibility rejected 
out of hand by an EU that cannot allow a third party to enforce its trade rules. 
The other would be advanced technology that would create borders but provide 
“maximum facilitation” of cross-border movement (“Max Fac”) -also rejected 
out of hand by the EU. Neither solution would be workable in the foreseeable 
future. Brexit is just around the corner. To get a trade deal the UK must solve the 
Irish problem, but the solution would be the dilution, if not the disintegration of 
the UK, or the reversal of Brexit. 
In a country without a written Constitution, Brexit has provoked a series of con-
stitutional crises, if not an existential one. Scotland voted to remain in the EU by 
62%, Northern Ireland by 56%, Gibraltar by 96%. The Unionists who keep the 
UK government in power misrepresent the wishes of the Northern Irish elec-
torate. The majority of Parliament wants to remain in the EU, or at least in the 
customs union. The Lords have consistently contradicted the government on 
every aspect of its Brexit policy. The executive branch will not allow a binding 
say in the matter for the devolved assemblies of Scotland or Northern Ireland 
and wants to avoid giving Parliament a say as well. A rump group of Brexiters is 
usurping the sovereignty of representatives of the people on the basis of a tiny 
referendum majority for a Leave vote that surprised its own supporters. Brexit 
was about party politics, electioneering, back-stabbing and power plays among 
the Tories and widespread social discontent, not the EU or globalisation. 
One of the ironies resulting from this turmoil is the unanticipated resurgence of 
the possibility of reunifying Ireland if a majority of the population of the North 
voted in favour (Theresa May has revealed her doubts that a “border poll” in the 
North would preserve the Union). Another is the fact that the peace process only 
progressed when all sides accepted the need for consensus, abandoning blind 
adherence to a given ideology. Brexiters either ignore or reject this political wis-
dom. Negotiations are still under way. The Unionists may be wrong to trust the 
government in London. The UK could sacrifice Northern Ireland for the sake of 
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Great Britain. Nor can Ireland be entirely sure that the common front displayed 
so far by the rest of the EU will endure. Difficult decisions must be made. The EU 
seems to be clear about what it will not accept. The British side is divided and 
bewildered, and ready to blame Ireland and/or the EU for the consequences of 
a Brexit disaster. Perhaps imaginative solutions to the Irish dilemma will emerge 
in time, or perhaps no deal will be the worst deal.
